The UK's Chilcot Iraq Inquiry into the country's involvement in the 2003 invasion of Iraq has found former prime minister Tony Blair plunged the country into war based on “flawed intelligence” and without UN support.
The report from the Chilcot Inquiry, which began on June 15, 2009 and was originally due to be handed down in 2010, determined “there was no imminent threat from [former Iraqi dictator] Saddam Hussein”.
It also found “the strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time” and that the majority of the United Nations Security Council had “supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring”.
Related reading
Iraqis want tougher approach as Baghdad attack toll rises
The head of the Iraq inquiry, Sir John Chilcot, handed down the committee's findings in London on Wednesday, saying "the policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments".
"We have concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted," he said.
"Military action at that time was not a last resort."
He said UN Security Council had declined to authorise the invasion because, "without evidence of major new Iraqi violations or reports from the [weapons] inspectors that Iraq was failing to co-operate...most members of the Security Council could not be convinced that peaceful options to disarm Iraq had been exhausted".
"In absence of a majority in support of military action, we consider that the UK was, in fact, undermining the Security Council's authority," Sir John said.
"The inquiry has not expressed a view on whether military action was legal.
"We have, however, concluded that the circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were far from satisfactory."
Iraq threat overstated
Sir John said Mr Blair, and the Joint Intelligence Committee, had overstated the threat posed by Iraq and its former dictator Saddam Hussein in a dossier he presented to the House of Commons and in declaring there was a "secure legal basis for military action".
"The judgments about Iraq's capabilities in that statement, and in the dossier published the same day, were presented with a certainty that was not justified," Sir John said.
"The Joint Intelligence Committee should have made clear to Mr Blair that the assessed intelligence had not established 'beyond doubt' either that Iraq had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued."
Sir John used his speech to lay out a timeline of what had happened in the months leading up to the decision to invade Iraq in March, 2003.
He noted Mr Blair’s approach to invading Iraq had moved from urging caution following the September 11, 2001 attacks, to suggesting “that the US and UK should work on what he described as a ‘clever strategy’ for regime change in Iraq”.
By March 18, 2003, despite attempts to get UN approval for military action in Iraq, Mr Blair had told the House of Commons “the possibility of terrorist groups in possession of weapons of mass destruction was a ‘real and present danger to Britain and its national security’” and that threat could not be contained.
In a confidential memo to then US president George W Bush, Mr Blair wrote, "I will be with you, whatever".
“Mr Blair had been warned, however, that military action would increase the threat from Al Qaida to the UK and to UK interests,” Sir John said.
“He had also been warned that an invasion might lead to Iraq’s weapons and capabilities being transferred into the hands of terrorists.
“It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments.
“They were not challenged and they should have been."
Risks 'explicitly identified'
Sir John criticised Mr Blair’s failure to take the decision to involve the UK in the invasion to the Cabinet and for failing to properly prepare the country’s armed forces, for both the invasion and the rebuilding phase afterwards.
“Mr Blair told the [October 2004 Iraq Survey Group inquiry] that the difficulties encountered in Iraq after the invasion could not have been known in advance,” he said.
“We do not agree that hindsight is required.
“The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active Iranian pursuit of its interests, regional instability and Al Qaida in Iraq were each explicitly identified before the invasion.
Related reading
Blair admits to mistakes in invading Iraq under Hussein
“The risks were neither properly identified nor fully exposed to ministers.
“[Mr Blair] did not ensure that there was a flexible, realistic and fully resourced plan that integrated UK military and civilian contributions and addressed the known risks.
“The failures in the planning and preparations continued to have an effect after the invasion.
"The government failed to achieve its stated objectives.”
Sir John acknowledged the "great courage" of the UK service personnel and civilians deployed to Iraq, as well as the more than 200 British soldiers who were killed and the 150,000 Iraqi civilians who fell victim to the fighting.
Sir John said Mr Blair had “overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq” and the UK should have questioned the US more.
Lessons to be learned
The report includes “lessons” as a result of the inquiry including:
- The importance of collective ministerial discussion which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge.
- The need to assess risks, weigh options and set an achievable and realistic strategy.
- The vital role of ministerial leadership and co-ordination of action across government, supported by senior officials.
- The need to ensure that both the civilian and military arms of government are properly equipped for their tasks.
“Above all, the lesson is that all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with the utmost rigour,” Sir John said.
Related reading
The Chilcot report in numbers
